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Abstract 
This paper shows that smoking intensity, i.e. the amount of nicotine extracted per cigarette 
smoked, responds to changes in excise taxes and tobacco prices. We exploit data covering the 
period 1988 to 2006 across many US states. Moreover, we provide new evidence on the 
importance of cotinine measures in explaining long-run smoking behaviour and we 
investigate the sensitivity of smoking cessation to changes in excise taxes and their 
interaction with smoking intensity. 
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In this reply, we make a number of contributions to the literature on smoking behavior and 
tobacco control. We show that the intensity of smoking, defined as the ratio of cotinine levels 
to the number of cigarettes smoked, does respond to changes in excise taxes as previously 
found by Adda and Cornaglia (2006) (AC hereafter). We do so by using a data set that spans 
from 1988 to 2006, allowing for more variations in taxes than in AC (2006), and in Abevaya 
and Puzzello 2010 (AP hereafter) who considered the period 1988-1994. 
We also show that smoking intensity responds to price changes over this period, and 
that consistent estimates require the use of instrumental variables because of endogeneity 
issues. We show that OLS estimates are biased towards finding no effects. We find that the 
tax elasticity of smoking intensity is significantly different from zero and equal to 0.07 and 
that the price elasticity is higher, at around one. We also find considerable heterogeneity in 
the response to tax increases across different groups, and notably across different race groups.  
We then investigate whether biomarkers such as cotinine measures are informative of 
long-run outcomes. We provide supporting evidence using novel panel data which follows 
smokers over 15 years. We show that cotinine levels are a strong predictor of smoking 
cessation, over and above the number of cigarette smoked. We finally use this data to shed 
further light on dynamic selection, and its potential to bias OLS regressions of smoking 
intensity on changes in prices and taxes.  
We first present in Section 1 new evidence of compensatory behavior in response to 
tax changes. In Section 2, we present effects of prices on smoking intensity. Section 3 shows 
that cotinine measures are significant predictors of long-run outcomes. Finally, Section 4 
investigates the potential for dynamic bias. 
 
 
I.  Smoking Intensity and Taxes 
 
AP (2010) expand the original data set used by AC (2006) to cover more states during the 
same period covered by the NHANES III data set (1988-1994). A main difference between 
the two datasets is the inclusion of tobacco states. These states are characterized by higher 
cigarette consumption, lower taxes, and little variation in excise taxes over that period. 
Essentially, when including these states, the effect of taxes become much less precise and a 
number of estimated elasticities become insignificant.  
AP (2010) rightly point out that the standard errors should be clustered at state level 
only, rather than at state times year level. While AC (2006) do not cluster at state level,  Adda 
and Cornaglia (2010) – AC (2010) hereafter - rely on such inference.  
AP (2010) observe that one needs sufficient variation in taxes across state and time to 
be able to identify the parameter of interest. This is certainly the case, but in a context of 
regressions which include state fixed effects, it is important to expand the data to add more 
time variation. The NHANES data have expanded over the years and more waves are 
available for analysis, for a period which has seen more variation in prices and excise taxes 
than the early nineties. We supplement the NHANES III data set with later waves between 
1999 and 2006. This data have been used by AC (2010) to investigate the effect of smoking 
bans and excise taxes on non-smokers.  We use this data set in this reply to analyse the effect 
of taxes on smoking intensity. For a description of the data set, we refer the reader to  AC 
(2010). Adding these additional years improves the analysis greatly as there has been lots of 
variation in taxes between 1988 and 2006, and allows, as pointed out by AP (2010) to better 
identify the parameter of interst. 
AC (2006) provide results for various specifications, including conditioning on onset 
of smoking or cotinine levels, to address the issue of dynamic selection. Here we present the 
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regressions of the baseline specification, for the subset of smokers who started smoking 
before age 17. We return to the dynamic selection issue in Section IV. 
We first address the issue of using sample weights in regression involving NHANES 
data. AP (2010) follow DuMouchel and Duncan (1983) who show that differences between 
coefficients in weighted and unweighted regressions is a sign of mispecification. As pointed 
out in DuMouchel and Duncan (1983), this is however only true when weights are derived 
from exogenous variables. The weighting scheme in NHANES is more complex. The weights 
are a function of demographic variables, because the survey oversampled certain categories 
such as age groups or racial groups. In addition, the weights were constructed to take into 
account non-participation, especially for the medical exam from where the cotinine measure 
is taken. Hence, the weights are also a function of the endogenous variable. This is why the 
NCHS strongly recommends to use weights in the analysis (we refer the reader to the 
NHANES guidelines (NCHS, 1996) for a detailed description). AC (2006)  overlooked this 
issue, but AC (2010) use them in their regressions.  
Before analyzing the behavioral effect of taxes on smoking, we show empirical 
evidence that the sample weights are indeed correlated with the outcome variable, over and 
above demographic characteristics. Table 1 displays the correlation between the outcome 
variable of our regressions and the weights (with p-values in parenthesis). We distinguish 
between three outcome variables, the log number of cigarettes smoked per day, log cotinine 
concentration, and the log smoking intensity. The correlation between these three outcome 
variables and the sample weights varies between 0.1 and 0.27 in the sample 1988-1994, and 
between 0.1and 0.22 in the extended sample (1988-2006). Once we control for a set of 
observable characteristics, which include age, sex, race, education, region of residence and 
year of examination, the correlation is closer to zero but statistically different from zero. The 
corelation ranges between 0.05 to 0.15 in the sample 1988-1994 and from -0.02 to 0.07 in the 
extended sample. The results show that the sample weights are indeed correlated with the 
endogenous variable, even when a set of demographic controls are included. The problem is 
particularly severe in the sample used by AP, but less so with the extended data set we use in 
this note. In the presence of endogenous stratification, the assumptions in DuMouchel and 
Duncam (1983) are violated. As discussed in Maddala (1983), the use of weights is then 
recommended. When using data from NHANES, we present the results with and without 
weights for comparison with previous results. 
We now turn to the behavioral effect of taxes. We first note that there is a clear 
difference in focus between AC (2006) and AP (2010).  AC are interested in the existence of 
compensatory behavior, which amounts to testing whether the ratio of cotinine to cigarettes is 
significantly related to taxes, in other words, whether the tax elasticity of cigarettes is larger 
than the tax elasticity of cotinine. The fact that smoking intensity responds to public policies 
is an important finding for the design of health policies. As argued in AC, this has also 
consequences on the estimation of popular models such as the rational addiction model. AP, 
on the other hand, mainly test whether the elasticity of cotinine or cigarettes with respect to 
taxes or prices is significantly different from zero. It is of course possible that both the 
elasticities of cotinine and of cigarettes smoked are insignificant - perhaps because of lack of 
variability in the data - and that the elasticity of the intensity of smoking is significantly 
different from zero.  
Table 2 displays the results of OLS regressions of smoking intensity (defined as the 
ratio of cotinine and  the number of cigarettes smoked), the number of cigarettes smoked and 
cotinine levels, on log state taxes as well as demographic variables, state indicators and year 
indicators. All left hand side variables are log transformations for ease of interpretation. We 
first present regressions as in AP (2010), using the sample between 1988 and 1994, and our 
extended sample to 2006. The table has two panels, where we use unweighted and weighted 
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regressions. NHANES III and the subsequent NHANES surveys differ in the amount of 
demographic variables which were recorded. NHANES III has a wider set of explanatory 
variables. To make our results consistent across the table, we control for a set of variables 
which are present throught out all waves. These controls are age, sex, race and education 
levels. AC (2006) controlled also for occupation, household size and passive smoking, and in 
some cases for the time of examination and height. However, there is little reason why these 
additional controls should be correlated with state taxes, especially when the regressions 
include state and year fixed effects. Indeed, the results in AC (2006) show that the 
coefficients of interest are not significantly different when including a fuller list of controls.  
Table 2, column 1, confirms the results obtained by AP (2010). Unweighted 
regressions for the period 1988-1994 show that a one percent increase in taxes leads to a 6 
percent increase in smoking intensity, but this elasticity is not statistically significant. 
However, using the extended sample (column 2), taxes are significantly associated with 
smoking intensity. In particular, a one percent increase in taxes leads to an increase in 
smoking intensity of 7 percent. This number is smaller than the one obtained in the NHANES 
sample in AC (2006), but in line with the results in the same paper when using data from 
NHANES 1999-2000. The second panel uses the weights provided in the NHANES data set. 
The use of weights appears to be of particular importance in NHANES III, as the elasticity of 
smoking intensity is larger than the unweighted one, equal to 0.23 and significantly different 
from zero. Finally, on the larger sample, the use of weights appears to be less important, as 
we find a very similar tax elasticity of smoking intensity, equal to about 7 percent. Note that 
we also find a significant tax elasticity for the number of cigarettes smoked (-9 percent), but 
cotinine levels do not respond much to changes in taxes.  
As discussed in AC (2006), an OLS regression could overstate the effect of taxes on 
smoking intensity because of a dynamic selection bias, where light smokers could be more 
responsive to changes in taxes and quit smoking at a higher rate. As a robustness check AC 
(2006) used a sub-sample of smokers who started early (before age 17) and who are therefore 
less likely to quit. We repeat this analysis in Table 3. Column 1 uses the sample used in AP 
(2010). None of the elasticities using unweighted regressions are significantly different from 
zero. With weights, we find evidence of a significant effect of taxes on smoking intensity. 
With the larger data set (column 2), the results are in line with Table 1 and the original results 
of AC (2006). A 1 percent increase in excise taxes increases smoking intensity by about 0.1 
percent (this is the case in both the weighted and unweighted regressions). The increase in 
smoking intensity is the outcome of a significant decrease in the number of cigarette smoked, 
and no effect of taxes on cotinine concentration. These results suggest that the findings on the 
whole sample of smokers is not due to a change in the composition of smokers. We present 
further evidence on this issue in Section 4. 
Table 4 presents evidence of heterogenous effects. We estimate the tax elasticity of 
smoking intensity for various subgroups of smokers. We find evidence that compensatory 
behaviors are more important for men than women, and in particular for african-american 
than for whites. AC (2006) found evidence that this racial group smoke cigarettes more 
intensively than other racial groups. It appears that they are also more reactive to tax changes. 
There is not much evidence of a change in the elasticity by age groups. None are significantly 
different from zero at the 5 percentage confidence level. One reason is that sample sizes are 
becoming smaller when one stratifies the sample in such a way. It therefore shows the limits 
of such an exercise.  
Finally, smokers with income below the median income (defined as $ 26,500 annual 
income in 2000 dollars) have a higher elasticity than those above the median. The elasticities 




II.  Smoking Intensity and Prices 
 
AC (2006) did not provide price elasticities for two reasons. First, there is an issue with 
endogeneity to which we come back below. Second, from a public health point of view, states 
and governement can only manipulate prices through taxes, so the tax elasticities are 
important to shape policy.  
AP (2010) write that an OLS regression can recover consistent estimates of price 
elasticities, arguing that endogeneity is not a problem with micro data. We dispute this fact. 
First, the regression is indeed using micro data, but the real variation is at the state times year 
level, as argued by AP (2010) in their discussion about standard errors. Second, in the 
presence of aggregate (state) shock to demand, it is likely that tobacco companies change 
their prices to respond to such shocks. The fact that the influence of individuals is too small 
to affect prices is not the issue. In the presence of endogeneity, an OLS regression would tend 
to produce coefficients which are biased towards zero. A positive demand shock would 
induce an endogenous increase in prices, which would counteract the causal effect of prices 
on demand. To solve the issue of endogeneity, we instrument prices with arguably exogenous 
tax shocks. Taxes are often changed to raise revenue and not to counter demand shocks. 
In Table 5 we report estimates of price elasticities. The first column displays OLS 
results, without sample weights in the first panel, and with weights in the second. The OLS 
results are similar to those found in AP (2010), and consistent with the intuition detailed 
above. None of the elasticities are significantly different from zero. The second column 
displays instrumental variable estimates. We also report the F-statistic for the first stage, 
which has a value of 57. This indicates that state excise taxes are a significant predictor of 
prices, over and above state and year indicators. The instrumental variable estimates show 
that smoking intensity responds to price changes. Without sample weights, we find that a one 
percent increase in prices leads to a 0.76 percent increase in smoking intensity, significant at 
the 6 percent level. When sample weights are used, we find a price elastiticity  of smoking 
intensity of 1.05, significantly different from zero at the 5 percent confidence level. The table 
also displays an F test for the endogeneity of prices, which we carried on for the regressions 
involving smoking intensity. They show that the null of no endogeneity is strongly rejected, 
at a confidence level of 2 percent.  
 
 
III.  Long Run and Short Run Measures of Smoking 
 
It has been argued (AP, 2010) that the number of cigarettes smoked per day is a long-run 
measure of smoking whereas cotinine levels are a short-run measure. It is not clear what 
justifies such a categorisation, especially when only cross-sectional data is at hand in 
NHANES. Following this stated opinion, AP (2010) dismiss the measure of smoking 
intensity constructed by AC (2006), that is, the ratio of cotinine extracted per cigarette 
smoked. We dispute this fact and present two arguments in favor of considering cotinine 
measures a long term measure of smoking (and health). 
The first point is already developed in AC (2006). They present evidence of long-run 
health outcomes which are linked to the way cigarettes are smoked. We refer the reader to the 
discussion about lung cancer rates by race in the US, in section II.B in AC (2006).  
We provide further evidence using novel data from the Coronary Artery Risk 
Development in Young Adults (CARDIA) study. These data allow us to follow the same 
smokers over time, in contrast with the cross-sectional aspect of the NHANES dataset.  
The data were collected between 1985 and 2001 in four locations in the US (Alabama, 
Ilinois, Minesotta and California). A group of 5115 individuals aged 18-30, were followed 
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over 15 years, which provides ample longitudinal variation as opposed to the NHANES. The 
survey asks a number of questions on smoking behavior at each wave, whether the individual 
is still smoking at the time, and if not, the age at which smoking cessation took place. We 
define age at smoking cessation as the age of the first recorded quit, whether the individual 
relapses after that period or not. We therefore only consider one smoking spell per smoker. In 
addition, the survey records the number of cigarettes smoked in all waves, cotinine levels in 
the first wave as well as the age of smoking initiation. Table 6 presents key desciptives of the 
dataset, and we refer the reader to Friedman et al (1988) for a detailed description of this data 
set.  
We measure the propensity to quit as a function of both the number of cigarettes 
smoked and the cotinine levels at baseline in 1985. We estimate a duration model, using a 
Cox proportional form, where we stratify by geographical location, sex, race, education and 
age at smoking onset. The data provide us with information on 11,073 observations following 
1,459 smokers until they quit or are right censored. We normalised both the number of 
cigarettes and cotinine levels to have mean zero and variance one, so that we can interpret the 
coefficients in a straightforward way.  
Table 7 displays the results. We find that the number of cigarettes smoked per day is 
not significant at the 5 percent level, but interestingly, cotinine levels are a highly significant 
predictor of quitting behavior (column 1). Controling for the number of cigarettes, a one 
standard deviation increase in cotinine levels at baseline decreases the likelihood to quit by 
49 percent. Similarly, holding cotinine levels constant, a one standard deviation increase in 
cigarettes is associated with a decrease of 2 percent in the likelihood of quitting. Hence the 
statement that cotinine is only a short-run measure does not appear to be grounded in facts as 
it significantly predicts quitting over a period of 15 years.   
We also explored heterogenous effects. Table 7 columns labelled 2 and 3 distinguish 
the effect of cotinine and the number of cigarettes on quitting behavior by sex. Men and 
women differ in their propensity to quit. In particular,  cotinine levels play a bigger role for 
men than for women.  
 
 
IV.  Dynamic Selection 
 
An important issue refers to dynamic selection, whereby smokers who quit following an 
increase in taxes may come disproportionally from a low smoking intensity group. This has 
been raised by both AC (2006) and by AP (2010). If this is the case, an OLS regression of 
smoking intensity on excise taxes may find a spurious positive effect due to a change in 
composition in the pool of smokers. AC (2006) investigate this point in two ways. They first 
include in their sample individuals who are less likely to quit, for instance individuals who 
started smoking at a young age to explore the effect of taxes on smoking intensity. Second, 
they use an econometric technique developed by Manski (1994), to use worst case bounds. 
However, with only cross-sectional data this point could not be fully addressed as the bounds 
tend to be large. Using the panel data from CARDIA, we now present new evidence on this 
issue, which helps to interpret the results in AC (2006), and in Table 1 in this article.  
We estimate the effect of tax changes on quitting behavior and whether the effects 
vary with smoking intensity as measured at baseline by the ratio of cigarettes to cotinine 
levels. Using geographical information on the center of examination, we merge information 
on excise taxes  to the original CARDIA data. We therefore have variation on taxes across 





Table 8 presents the effect of taxes on quitting, for the whole sample, as well as for 
smokers divided into two groups, below or over the median smoking intensity measured at 
baseline in 1985. The first panel displays the results, controlling for age, sex, race, education, 
state of residence and a quadratic time trend. We find a significant effect of taxes on quitting 
behavior. A doubling of the excise tax increases the likelihood of quitting by 63 percent. 
Interestingly, the point estimate of this effect is larger for individuals with a high smoking 
intensity than for a low smoking intensity. The former have a likelihood of quitting of 55 
percent and the latter of 93 percent. However, the estimation is not precise enough to 
conclude that the difference is significant. The second panel includes year fixed effects rather 
than a quadratic trend. We get qualitatively similar results, although with much less precision.  
The results suggests that the dynamic bias may not be of such importance, and that 
OLS regressions do not overstate the effect of taxes on smoking intensity. Understanding 
why individuals with higher smoking intensity may be more likely to quit when taxes 
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Table 1: Correlation between Sample Weights and Smoking Behavior 
 NHANES 1988-1994 NHANES 1988-2006 
Log no. of cigarettes 0.27** (0.00) 0.15 ** 
(0.00) 
0.22** (0.00) 0.07** (0.00) 
Log cotinine 0.10** (0.00) 0.11** (0.00) 0.10** (0.00) 0.05** (0.00) 







No. of observations 3,514 3,514 6,318 6,318 
Controls No  Yes No Yes 
Notes: p-values in parenthesis. Controls include age, age square, sex, race, education, state of 








Table 2: Tax Elasticity of Smoking Intensity, Number of Cigarettes and of Cotinine. 
Baseline 
 (1) (2) 
 AP Sample 
1988-1994 
Expanded Sample  
1988-2006 
Unweighted regressions 
Elasticity smoking intensity 0.062 0.074** 
 (0.055) (0.035) 
Elasticity no. of cigarettes -0.001 -0.070 
 (0.088) (0.051) 
Elasticity, cotinine 0.060 0.005 
 (0.057) (0.030) 
Weighted regressions 
Elasticity smoking intensity 0.227** 0.0691** 
 (0.089) (0.029) 
Elasticity no. of cigarettes -0.059 -0.089** 
 (0.132) (0.044) 
Elasticity, cotinine 0.168* -0.020 
 (0.095) (0.038) 
Number of observations 3514 6318 
Notes: All regressions control for age, sex, race, education, year and state effects. Robust standard 












Table 3: Tax Elasticity of Smoking Intensity, Number of Cigarettes and of Cotinine. 
Early Starters. 
 (1) (2) 
 AP Sample 
1988-1994 
Expanded Sample  
1988-2006 
Unweighted Regressions 
Elasticity smoking intensity 0.081 0.097** 
 (0.067) (0.037) 
Elasticity no. of cigarettes -0.022 -0.105** 
 (0.093) (0.050) 
Elasticity, cotinine 0.059 -0.009 
 (0.086) (0.031) 
Weighted Regressions 
Elasticity smoking intensity 0.205** 0.109** 
 (0.077) (0.033) 
Elasticity no. of cigarettes 0.084 -0.126** 
 (0.134) (0.060) 
Elasticity, cotinine 0.280** -0.016 
 (0.118) (0.046) 
Number of observations 2060 3611 
Notes: All regressions control for age, sex, race, education, year and state effects. The regressions 
exclude smokers who started after age 17. Robust standard errors clustered at state level. *,** 










Table 4: Smoking Intensity - Tax Elasticities for different Subsamples 
 Coeff. Std. Err. Sample size 
Full sample, 1988-2006 0.069** (0.029) 6,318 
Men 0.105** (0.039) 3,423 
Women 0.049 (0.045) 2,895 
White 0.053 (0.039) 3,690 
Black 0.193** (0.075) 1,943 
Ages 17-29 0.085 (0.06) 1,464 
Ages 30-44 0.075* (0.041) 2,167 
Ages 45+ 0.062 (0.043) 2,687 
Below median income  0.110** (0.055) 2,919 
Above median income  0.058* (0.034) 3,399 
Notes: Regressions control for age, sex, race, education, state of residence and year of interview. All 
regressions are weighted using NHANES sample weights. Standard errors in parenthesis are 










Table 5: Price Elasticity of Smoking Intensity, Number of Cigarettes and Cotinine 
 (1) (2) 
 OLS IV 
Unweighted regressions 
Elasticity smoking intensity 0.062 0.761* 
 (0.336) (0.418) 
Elasticity no. of cigarettes 0.101 -0.245 
 (0.501) (0.577) 
Elasticity, cotinine 0.164 0.517 
 (0.377) (0.418) 
F statistic first stage; (pval) - 57.12; (0.00) 
F test of endogeneity; (pval) - 10.99; (0.02) 
Weighted regressions 
Elasticity smoking intensity 0.393 1.056** 
 (0.397) (0.455) 
Elasticity no. of cigarettes -0.514 -0.891* 
 (0.313) (0.492) 
Elasticity, cotinine -0.121 0.165 
 (0.365) (0.407) 
Number of observations 4870 4870 
F statistic first stage; (pval)  - 57.12; (0.00) 
F test of endogeneity; (pval) - 10.99; (0.002) 
Notes: Sample: NHANES 1988-2006. All regressions control for age, sex, race, education, year and 
state effects. Prices are instrumented with state tax levels. Robust standard errors clustered at state 









Table 6: Descriptive Statistics, CARDIA Sample  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All individuals 
at baseline 
(year 0) 
Year 15 Year 15 
individuals still 
smoking 
Number of observations 1546 923 633 
Smoking prevalence, % 100 68.5 100 
Mean number of cigarettes 13.1 (9.1) 9.2 (10.0) 13.4 (9.5) 
Mean number cigarettes at baseline 13.1 (9.1) 13.4 (9.5)  13.8 (8.9) 
Mean cotinine level at baseline ng/ml 224.4 (158.4) 222.2 (153.8) 241.1 (152.1) 
Male, % 47.2 45.3 47.0 
White, % 57.1 52.9 60.5 
African-American, % 42.8 47.1 39.5 
Mean age 25.0 (3.6) 40.0 (3.6) 40.0 (3.6) 
Mean years of schooling 12.8 (2.0) 13.0 (2.0) 12.8 (1.9) 





Table 7: Hazard Rates for Quitting Smoking 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Men Women 
Number of cigarettes -0.021 0.183 -0.153 
 (0.077) (0.115) (0.11) 
Cotinine levels -0.493** -0.598** -0.445** 
 (0.093) (0.162) (0.114) 
Number of observations 1459 691 768 
Time at risk 11073 5418 5655 
Notes: Cox proportional regression. Age is the analysis time. Stratified by sex (first column), race, 
education, state, year and age at smoking onset. CARDIA data. Number of cigarettes and cotinince 





Table 8: Effect of State Tax on Quitting, by Level of Smoking Intensity 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Intensity<median Intensity>median 
Controlling for year and year square 
Log tax 0.629** 0.557** 0.930** 
 (0.230) (0.295) (0.409) 
Controlling for year fixed effects 
Log tax 0.380* 0.231 0.693 
 (0.239) (0.311) (0.434) 
Number of observations 1477 857 616 
Time at risk 11185 6475 4698 
Notes: Cox proportional regression, stratified by sex, race, education, state and age at smoking 
onset. Regressions include year either through a quadratic specification or through year fixed 
effects. CARDIA data.  
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